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I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Defendant/ Appellant Alex Paul Giovanelli, (hereafter "Defendant") was a registered 
juvenile sex offender having been adjudicated as a juvenile to have committed the offense of 
Lewd Conduct with a Minor in Kootenai County, case number JV-2004-7986. After Defendant 
turned age 21, the Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney (hereafter "Plaintiff') filed a Petition 
to Require Adult Registration (hereafter "Petition") in the present case, Kootenai County district 
court case number CV-12-0004397, to remand Defendant to the adult sex offender registry, 
pursuant to IDAHO CODE § 18-8410. Clerk's Record (hereafter "CR") 5-7. 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Prior to the evidentiary hearing on Plaintiffs Petition, on or about February 15, 2013, 
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Judicial Notice asking the district court to take judicial notice of 
certain documents from Plaintiff's Kootenai County juvenile case number JV-2004-7986 and on 
or about February 20, 2013, Defendant filed an Objection to Motion for Judicial Notice. CR 3. 
On or about February 25, 2013, Plaintiff filed an Amended Notice for Judicial Notice. CR 4, 48-
49. 
The evidentiary hearing convened on February 28, 2013. Transcript on Appeal (hereafter 
"TR") 27. After considerable discussion and oral argument of counsel, the district court took 
judicial notice of some of the documents as requested by Plaintiff, but declined to do so with 
respect to the others. TR 28-57. Specifically, by its Order Re: Judicial Notice, entered March 1, 
2013, the district court granted judicial notice as to: 
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(1) The magistrate court's Order and Findings of Fact in Kootenai County 
Case Number JV-2004-7986, dated December 22, 2008; 
(2) Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered in Kootenai County 
Case Number JV-2004-7986 on October 9, 2009; and 
(3) The Decision on Appeal in Kootenai County Case Number JV-2004-7986 
entered by the district court (District Judge Lansing L. Haynes) on 
September 10, 2010. 
The district court declined judicial notice of asserted facts in three other documents from 
Kootenai County Case Number JV-2004-7986: 
(a) A social investigation filed on March 1, 2005; 
(b) A probation revocation/warrant of apprehension dated September 14, 
2009; and 
(c) An addendum to probation revocation request filed on September 23, 
2009. 
CR 48-49. 
Following oral argument and discussion on the question of judicial notice, TR 28-57, the 
evidentiary hearing proceeded to conclusion. Plaintiff called two witnesses and offered four 
exhibits, all of which were admitted, in its case in chief. Defendant called two witnesses in his 
defense, and Plaintiff recalled one witness in rebuttal. Defendant declined any surrebuttal. TR 
58-151. 
On March 5, 2013, the district court entered its decision in Kootenai County Case 
Number CV-12-0004397, which granted Plaintiffs Petition to remand Defendant to the adult sex 
offender registry. CR 51-55. Defendant timely appealed. CR. 57-59. 
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III. ISSUE ON APPEAL 
The sole issue on appeal is whether the district court erred by taking judicial notice of 
adjudicative facts from Defendant's underlying juvenile case on the day of the evidentiary 
hearing on Plaintiffs Petition to remand Defendant to the adult sex offender registry. Stated 
slightly differently, the issue is whether the district court should have allowed Defendant to re-
litigate the adjudicative facts from his underlying juvenile case in his defense of Plaintiffs 
Petition. 
IV. STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Defendant did not offer a standard of review. Plaintiff submits that the following 
standards apply in this case. 
Rules of evidence are treated like statutes. State v. Button, 134 Idaho 864, 11 P.3d 483 
(Ct.App. 2000) citing State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814,821,965 P.2d 174, 181 (1998). The 
interpretation of a rule of evidence, like the interpretation of a statute, is reviewed de nova. 
Moore, 131 Idaho at 821, 965 P.2d at 181. 
The decision to admit evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Moore, 131 Idaho at 
822, 965 P.2d at 182; State v. Waller, 140 Idaho 764, 101 P.3d 708 (Ct.App. 2004) (In reviewing 
admission of evidence the appellate court will apply an abuse of discretion standard of review; 
however, questions of relevancy are subject to free review because relevancy is a question of 
law). 
Where a matter is committed to the discretion of the trial court, the appellate court 
conducts a three-tiered inquiry to consider: (1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the 
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issue as one_ of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such 
discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) 
whether the lower court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Waddle, 
125 Idaho 526,528,873 P.2d 171, 173 (Ct.App. 1994) (citation omitted). 
Whether collateral estoppel bars the re-litigation of issues adjudicated in prior litigation 
between the same parties is a question of law upon which this Court exercises free review. 
Richardson v. Four Thousand Five Hundred Forty-Three Dollars, US. Currency, 120 Idaho 
220, 814 P.2d 952 (Ct.App. 1991) (citations omitted). 
V. ARGUMENT AND ANALYSIS 
A. Defendant Offers No Authority for His Arguments. 
Defendant complains about a single development in the course of the district court 
proceedings below. He argues that Plaintiff sought to have the district court take judicial notice 
of six documents that from Defendant's underlying juvenile case and that"[ d]espite a scheduling 
order that required all motions to be filed and heard no later than seven says prior to the 
evidentiary hearing, the District court granted this motion on the day of the evidentiary hearing." 
He argues that "to allow requests for judicial notice to be taken without the opportunity for the 
opposing party to object would dramatically hamper a litigant's ability to prepare for hearings 
and defend against actions by the state." Appellant's Brief, p. 3. 
Defendant asserts further that by "failing to abide by its own scheduling order and Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 7(b )(3)(A), the District Court severely prejudiced Mr. Giovanelli and 
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allowed the State to establish several crucial facts without calling any witnesses." Id., p. 4. 
Defendant complains that such findings of fact could not have been made "absent the granting of 
the State's motion for Judicial Notice and by including them in its findings of fact, the District 
Court is acknowledging that these facts were crucial to its decision to grant the State's petition." 
Id. 
Defendant also argues that by the district court taking judicial notice, it prejudiced his 
defense against the State's petition to require him to register as an adult sex offender because it 
allowed the state to "prove the majority of their case without calling any witnesses." Id. 
This Court does not consider arguments unsupported by authority, even if authority is 
later presented in a reply brief. Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 790-791, 229 P .3d 1146, 1152-
1153 (2010), citing Michael v. Zehm, 74 Idaho 442,445,263 P.2d 990,993 (1953). See also, 
State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259,263,923 P.2d 966,970 (1996) ("When issues on appeal are not 
supported by propositions of law, authority, or argument, they will not be considered."). 
Defendant having offered no support or citation to authority of any kind, whether rule, 
statute or case law, this Court should not consider any of Defendant's arguments that the district 
court erred when it granted the state's request for judicial notice on the day of the evidentiary 
hearing. 
On this basis alone, this Court should summarily dismiss this appeal and award Plaintiff 
costs and reasonable attorney fees for having to respond to this appeal. IDAHO CODE§ 12-117. 
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B. Application of I.R.E. 201. 
Even if this Court were to consider Defendant's arguments, the Court should affirm the 
district court's decisions on the application of I.R.E. 201 for taking judicial notice. 
1. The District Court's Interpretation of I.R.E. 201 Was Correct. 
Under I.R.E. 20l(d): 
When a party makes an oral or written request that a court take judicial 
notice of records, exhibits or transcripts from the court file in the same or 
a separate case, the party shall identify the specific documents or items for 
which the judicial notice is requested or shall proffer to the court and serve 
on all parties copies of such documents or items. A court shall take 
judicial notice if requested by a party and supplied with the necessary 
information. 
In this case, Plaintiff provided specified documents from Defendant's underlying juvenile 
case to the district court hearing the Petition. The district court recognized that judicial notice 
was mandatory and properly applied it. The district court also recognized that under I.R.E. 
20l(a), which describes the scope of the rule,judicial notice applied only to adjudicative facts. 
The district court's interpretation of I.R.E. 201 was therefore correct. 
2. The District Court's Exercise of Discretion in the Application of I. R. E. 201 
Judicial Notice Was Proper. 
It is well-settled that "[a] trial court has "broad discretion" in determining whether to 
admit or exclude evidence, and its judgment in the fact finding role will only be disturbed on 
appeal when there has been a clear abuse of discretion." State v. Watkins, 148 Idaho 418,421, 
224 P.3d 485,488 (2009) (quoting State v. Gleason, 123 Idaho 62, 65,844 P.2d 691,694 (1992)) 
(emphasis in the original). Even if there is "an incorrect ruling regarding evidence, this Court 
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will grant relief on appeal only if the error affects a substantial right of one of the parties." State 
v. Shakelford, 150 Idaho 355,247 P.3d 582,590 (2010) (quoting Obendorf v. Terra Hug Spray 
Co., 145 Idaho 892,897, 188 P.3d 834, 839 (2008). 
As to takingjudicial notice under I.R.E. 201, in State v. Doe, 146 Idaho 386, 195 P.3d 
745 (Ct.App. 2008) the Idaho Court of Appeals addressed the rules' application: 
Judicial notice is a mechanism enabling a judge to excuse the party having the 
burden of establishing a fact from producing formal proof of that fact. Brazier v. 
Brazier, 111 Idaho 692, 700, 726 P.2d 1143, 1151 (Ct.App. 1986) (citing E. 
CLEARY, McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 328 (1984))) overruled in part on 
other grounds by Swope v. Swope, 112 Idaho 974,982, 739 P.2d 273,281 (1987). 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 201 (b) provides that a judicially noticed fact must be one 
not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready 
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 
questioned. Other provisions in the rule allow the court to take judicial notice 
whether requested or not, I.R.E. 201(c), and provide that judicial notice may be 
taken at any stage of the proceeding, I.R.E. 201(f). 
In this case, the district court determined that the accuracy of the judges' factual findings 
in Defendant's underlying juvenile case could not reasonably be questioned. TR 53-56. 
Also, in its on-the-record discussion of whether to take judicial notice of some of the 
documents from the underlying juvenile proceedings, the district court made several specific 
findings. 
First, since a court may take judicial notice at any stage of the proceedings, I.R.E. 201(f), 
the district court did not err when it took judicial notice of the factual findings from Defendant's 
underlying juvenile case on the day of the evidentiary hearing. The district court stated: "The 
Court specifically finds that this is not an untimely motion to the extent that it prejudices the 
PLAINTIFF /RESPONDENT'S BRIEF Page 7 
defendant's ability to defend in this particular civil action." TR 52. 
Second, the district court recognized that it was in its discretion whether to take judicial 
notice. TR 53. 
Third, the district court correctly recognized that subsection (b) of IRE 201 identified the 
kinds of facts that can be subject to judicial notice: facts that are either generally known within 
the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or facts that are capable of accurate and ready 
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. TR 53. 
Fourth, the district court found that in the underlying juvenile proceedings, it"[ c ]annot be 
disputed that the particular judge made particular findings at a certain time" and took judicial 
notice of documents from the juvenile proceedings that rose to that level. TR 53-54, 56. 
Fifth, as to factual assertions contained in documents from the juvenile proceedings that 
were not found by a particular judge in those proceedings, the district court acknowledged the 
existence of those documents, but declined to take judicial notice of their assertions of fact. TR 
54-56. 
The district court correctly interpreted I.R.E. 201 and correctly exercised its discretion 
under that rule when it took judicial notice of adjudicative facts from Defendant's underlying 
criminal case. 
C. The Application of Collateral Estoppel. 
Defendant asserts that he was prejudiced when the district court, by taking judicial notice 
of adjudicative facts from his juvenile case, allowed Plaintiff to prove the majority of its case 
PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT'S BRIEF Page8 
without calling any witnesses. Defendant's Brief, p. 4. During oral argument below, Defendant 
argued that if the district court took judicial notice of the facts contained in the documents 
provided by Plaintiff, he would be denied "the due process of asking questions of these witnesses 
to see if these facts were actually true." TR 47. In response to this, Plaintiff argued that 
collateral estoppel precluded Defendant "from contesting something that's already found, 
litigated upon and decided by a court." TR 51. 
"Under the judicially-developed doctrine of collateral estoppel, once a court has decided 
an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that decision is conclusive in a subsequent suit 
based on a different cause of action involving a party to the prior litigation .... Collateral 
estoppel, like the related doctrine of res judicata, serves to "relieve parties of the cost and 
vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent 
decisions, encourage reliance on adjudication. [Footnote and citations omitted.]" Richardson v. 
Four Thousand Five Hundred Forty-Three Dollars, US. Currency, 120 Idaho 220,222, 814 
P.2d 952, 954 (Ct.App. 1991). Collateral estoppel applies to issues that actually and necessarily 
have been decided in prior litigation and applies to essential facts. Brown v. State, Indus. Special 
Indem. Fund, 138 Idaho 493,496, 65 P.3d 515,518 (2003). 
Although the record in Defendant's juvenile case is apparently sealed, TR 48, clearly 
Defendant and the state were in privity in that case. The facts decided in that case were actually 
decided after a full and fair opportunity to litigate them; there were two separate findings of fact 
at the magistrate level and a decision on appeal to the district court. This is precisely the 
situation to which collateral estoppel applies. 
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Defendant should not be allowed to re-litigate facts that have already been ruled on by 
the criminal court. Therefore, the district court properly considered those facts, both under I.R.E. 
201 and under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Court should dismiss this appeal for Defendant's failure to 
provide any citation to authority to support his arguments. 
If the Court determines that Defendant's arguments should be considered, it should then: 
(1) Affirm the district court's decision to apply judicial notice to adjudicative facts from 
Defendant's underlying juvenile case; 
(2) Hold that the doctrine of collateral estoppel barred Defendant from re-litigating the 
adjudicative facts in his underlying juvenile case; and 
(3) Affirm the district court's decision to grant Plaintiffs Petition and require Defendant 
to register on Idaho's adult sex offender registry. 
( 4) Award Plaintiff its costs and reasonable attorney fees for having to respond to this 
appeal. 
Dated this 'j, 2 day of October 2013. 
PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
{ ); 
. l\._ A 
STEPH 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT 
Page 10 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
2 ) I hereby certify that on this---~-- day of October 2013, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT'S BRIEF in the above-
referenced matter by United States Mail, Postage paid, and addressed to the following: 
Christopher D. Schwartz 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
400 Northwest Blvd 
PO Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene ID 83816 
cschwartz@kcgov.us 
PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
_ by U. S. MAIL 
_ by HAND DELIVERY 
_ by FACSIMILE 
_ by OVERNIGHT MAIL 
by EMAIL 
~-
•. -~ ,j ( l) / I {(: 1L · < ... ( / 
STEPHANIE A. ALTIG 
Deputy Attorney General 
Page 11 
